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Distributional Eﬀects in a
General Equilibrium Analysis of
Social Security
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan Walliser
8.1 Introduction
This paper reviews and extends our recent general equilibrium analyses
of the distributional eﬀects of Social Security. The model is based on the
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) model, which computes the perfect fore-
sight transition path of a life-cycle economy consisting of multiple overlap-
ping generations. However, unlike the original Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ model,
the new version of the model includes intragenerational heterogeneity and
am uchm ore detailed speciﬁcation of U.S. ﬁscal institutions.1 The latest
version of the model, which is still in a very preliminary state, incorporates
am orer e alistic pattern of births and length of life.
We reach six conclusions. First, Social Security’s privatization can sub-
stantially raise long-run living standards. However, achieving these gains
will take a considerable amount of time and will entail some welfare losses
to transition generations. Second, Social Security’s privatization helps the
long-run poor even absent any explicit redistribution mechanism. This re-
ﬂects both the opportunity cost of the current pay-as-you-go system as
well as the impact of privatization on capital deepening. Third, privatiza-
tionsthatfeaturevoluntaryratherthancompulsoryexitfromtheoldsystem
327have particularly low transition costs and particularly favorable macro-
economic and distributional consequences despite the adverse selection
they entail. Fourth, privatizations, like those advocated by the World Bank
(1994), that provide a ﬂat (minimum) beneﬁt, can actually make the long-
run poor worse oﬀ relative to privatizations without a ﬂat beneﬁt because
they pay-as-you-go ﬁnance the ﬂat beneﬁt with a signiﬁcant payroll tax.
Fifth, combining privatization with a progressive match to contributions
beneﬁts the lifetime poor relative to privatization without a match. Sixth,
when America’s aging is considered, the long-run gains to Social Security’s
privatization are greater because the status-quo alternative entails a sub-
stantial long-run increase in the rate of payroll taxation.
Thep aper proceeds in section 8.2 with a review of some of the recent
simulation literature on Social Security. Section 8.3 describes our base
model, which does not include our newest enhancements to the demo-
graphic structure. Section 8.4 uses the model to explore privatization. The
results presented here drawo nK o tlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1997,
1998a, b, and 1999a, b). Section 8.5 presents some very preliminary results
using the demographic variant of the model. Section 8.6 concludes.
8.2 Literature Review
Feldstein’s (1974) seminal article on Social Security’s impact on national
saving has, over the years, stimulated a plethora of related studies. The
majority of these have been theoretical and empirical, but a growing num-
beri nvolve simulating Social Security’s dynamic general equilibrium
eﬀects within macroeconomic models that have microeconomic founda-
tions. Early contributions here include Kotlikoﬀ (1979), Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ (1983), and Seidman (1986). These papers conﬁrmed Feldstein’s
theoretical prediction and empirical ﬁnding that unfunded Social Security
systems signiﬁcantly reduce nations’ long-run capital intensivities and liv-
ing standards. Kotlikoﬀ and Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ examined how introduc-
ing “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) Social Security would worsen an economy’s
economic position, notwithstanding induced changes in retirement behav-
ior. Seidman’s in contrast, appears to be the ﬁrst to study the economic
gains from eliminating unfunded Social Security.
More recent contributions include Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Auer-
bach et al. (1989), Hubbard and Judd (1987), Hansson and Stuart (1989),
Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993), Kotlikoﬀ (1996), Hubbard, Skinner,
and Zeldes (1994a, b, and 1995), Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1997,
1998a, b, and 1999a, b), Huang, I ˙mrohorog ˘lu, and Sargent (1997), and
I ˙mrohorog ˘lu, I ˙mrohorog ˘lu, and Joines (1995, 1999), Knudsen et al. (1999),
Fougere and Merette (1998, 1999), Schneider (1997), Raﬀelhuschen
(1993), Cooley and Soares (1999a, b), Huggett and Ventura (1999), De
Nardi, I ˙mrohorog ˘lu, and Sargent (1999), Galasso (1999), and others.
These studies have included a range of additional important factors, in-
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cluding demographics, land, earnings uncertainty, liquidity constraints,
and majority voting on the system’s continued existence. They have also
examined the diﬀerent ways a transition to a privatized Social Security
system could be ﬁnanced.
8.3 Description of Our Model
This section describes our base model as well as its calibration and solu-
tion methods. It draws heavily on similar descriptions in Altig et al. (2001),
Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1999a, b), and the review presented in
Kotlikoﬀ (2000). Section 8.5 describes how the model presentedi nthis
section is currently being modiﬁed to more accurately capture demograph-
ics. We report some very preliminary simulation results in that section.
8.3.1 Demographic Structure
Them odel contains a ﬁxed number of overlapping cohorts. Each period
in the model corresponds to a year. Adults live for ﬁfty-ﬁve years (from
aget wenty-one through seventy-ﬁve). Like that of Fullerton and Rogers
(1993), our model incorporates intragenerational heterogeneity in the form
of twelve lifetime-earnings groups. Each group has its own initial skill level
and its own longitudinal age-skill proﬁle. The twelve groups also have dis-
tinct bequest preferences. Our model has both advantages and disadvan-
tages relative to Fullerton and Rogers’s (1993) model. Some of the advan-
tages are the inclusion of a Social Security system, a detailed description
of non–Social Security taxes, the existence of government debt and endog-
enousb equests, and the ability to compute the economy’s perfect-foresight
transition path. The principal disadvantage is the lack of a highly detailed
production sector that includes multiple sectors and intermediate produc-
tion.H owever, the omission of this production sector detail may matter
little for our purposes, because the Social Security policies we examine do
not diﬀerentially aﬀectp articular industries or types of capital goods.
8.3.2 Preferences and Budget Constraints2
Each j-type agent who begins her economic life at date t chooses perfect-
foresight consumption paths (c), leisure paths (l), and intergenerational
transfers (b)t omaximize a time-separable utility function of the form.

























































In equation (1),  is the utility weight on leisure,  is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in the leisure-consumption composite, and  is
General Equilibrium Analysis of Social Security 3293. See Auerbach et al. (1989) for a more complete discussion of this strategy for dealing
with balanced growth.
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and lei-
sure. The parameter  j is a j-type speciﬁc utility weight placed on bequests
left to each child when the agent dies. The term 1/(1  ), where  is
the rate of time preference, is assumed to be the same for all agents.
Letting aj
s,t be capital holdings for type j agents,o fa g es,a tt i m et, max-
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where rt is the pretax return to savings, gj
s,t are gifts received from parents,
E j
s,t is the time endowment, b j
s,t denotes bequests made to each of the N 
(1  n)20 children, and the functions Tk(	)w ith tax base arguments B j,k
s,t de-
termine net tax payments from income sources k  T ˜  {C, K, W, Y, P}.
TC(	), TK(	), TW(	), TY(	), and TP(	)a re consumption taxes, capital income
taxes, wage taxes, income taxes, and Social Security payroll taxes, respec-
tively. Social Security beneﬁts are represented in equation (2) as negative
taxes with the base switching at the point of retirement from the contem-
poraneous payroll base to average indexed yearly earnings in the preretire-
ment years. All taxes are collected at the household level, and the tax sys-
tem includes both a personal income tax and a business proﬁts tax. The
bases for the wage and payroll taxes are smaller than total labor income
due to the base reductions discussed below.
An individual’s earning ability is an exogenous function of her age, her
type, and the level of labor-augmenting technical progress, which grows at
ac o nstant rate 
.W ec oncentrate all skill diﬀerences by age and type in
an eﬃciency parameter j
s.T h u s ,the wage rate for an agent of type j and
age s is w j
s,t  j
swt,w here wt is the growth-adjusted real wage at time t. j
s
increases with age to reﬂect not only the accumulation of human capital,
but also technical progress. To permit balanced growth for our speciﬁca-
tionso fp references given the restriction on leisure shown in equation (2),
we assume that technical progress also causes the time endowment of each
successive generation to grow at rate 
.3 More precisely, if E j
s,t is the endow-
ment of type j at age s and time t, then E j
s,t  (1 
 )E j
s,t–1,f o rall s, t,a n d
j.N o t i c et h a tthe endowment E j
s,t depends only on an agent’s year of birth.
Because E grows at rate 
 from one cohort to the next, there will be no
underlying trend in wt.T he growth-adjusted earnings ability proﬁles take
the form
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Values of the a coeﬃcients for j-type groups 1 through 12—in ascending
order of lifetime income—are based on regressions ﬁtted to the University
of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics and are taken from Altig
et al. (2001). Groups 1 and 12 comprise the bottom and top 2 percent of
lifetime wage income earners, and groups 2 and 11 the remaining 8 percent
of the top and bottom deciles. All other groups constitute 10 percent of
the population. For example, group 3 is the second decile of lifetime-wage
income, group four the third decile, and so on up to group 10. The esti-
mated longitudinal age-earnings-ability proﬁles are scaled to include the
eﬀects of technical progress. Given our benchmark parameterization, peak
hourly wages valued in 1996 dollars are $4.00, $14.70, and $79.50 for indi-
viduals in classes 1, 6, and 12, respectively. More generally, steady-state an-
nual labor incomes derived from the model’s assumptions and the endoge-
nous labor supply choices range from $9,000 to $130,000. As discussed
below, these calculations do not yet include labor compensation in the
form of fringe beneﬁts.
Bequests are received by children, with interest, at the beginning of the
period after they are made by their parents. We restrict all parental trans-
fers to bequests, so that b j
s,t  0, for s  75, and gj
s,t  0, for s  56. In the
steady state, therefore, gj  b j,f o rall j (where we have dropped the age
subscripts for convenience). The parameters  j are derived endogenously
for the initial steady state such that the ratio of the bequest to economy-
wide mean income corresponds to the ratio originally estimated by Men-
chik and David (1982) and updated by Fullerton and Rogers (1993). Be-
quests range from $4,800 to $450,000 for the lowest and highest lifetime
earnings classes, respectively.
The benchmark values for , , ,a n dn are those in Auerbach and Kot-
likoﬀ (1987). The parameter  is chosen so that agents devote, on average,
about4 0p ercent of their available time endowment (of sixteen hours per
day) to labor during their prime working years (real-life ages of roughly
twenty-one to ﬁfty-ﬁve).
8.3.3 The Non–Social Security Government Budget Constraint
At time t, the government collects tax revenues and issues debt (Dt1),
whichi tu ses to ﬁnance government purchases of goods and services (Gt)
and interest payments on the existing stock of debt (Dt). Letting  j be the
fraction of j-type agents in each generation, the non–Social Security part
of the government’s budget constraint evolves according to
(4)
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Thee x clusion of Social Security taxes in equation (4) reﬂects the fact that
Social Security currently uses self-ﬁnancing earmarked taxes.
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is unimportant.
5. The data used in this estimation were taken from all taxable returns in tax year 1993.
Thef unction was obtained by regressing deductions exclusive of mortgage interest expense
on the midpoints of reported income ranges. (The deduction of interest expense on home
mortgages was included in our calculation of the capital-income tax rate, as we will subse-
quently describe.) The regression yielded a coeﬃciento f0.0755 with an R2 equal to 0.99.
Government expenditures are assumed to be unproductive and generate
no utility to households.4 Thev alues of Gt and Dt are held ﬁxed per eﬀec-
tive worker throughout the transition path. Any reduction in government
outlays resulting from a change in the government’s real interest payments
is passed on to households in the form of a lower tax rate. The level of
government debt, Dt,w a schosen such that the associated real interest
payments equal about 3.5 percent of national income in the initial steady
state. The statutory tax schedules (described below) generate a level of rev-
enue above debt service such that the benchmark steady-state ratio of gov-
ernmentpurchases,Gt,tonationalincomeequals0.239.Thesevaluescorre-
spondveryclosely tothecorresponding1996valuesfor thecombinedlocal,
state, and federal government in the United States.
8.3.4 Non–Social Security Taxes
The benchmark tax system in our initial steady state is designed to ap-
proximate the salient aspects of the 1996 U.S. (federal, state, and local) tax
and transfer system. It features a hybrid tax system (incorporating wage-
income, capital-income, and consumption tax elements) and payroll taxa-
tion for the Social Security and Medicare programs. To adjust for tax eva-
sion,w er educe income taxes by 2.6 percentage points. This adjustment is
consistent with the degree of tax evasion reported in Slemrod and Bakija
(1996). In the various alternative tax structure experiments, we assume that
evasion reduces the postreform tax base (income net of deductions and
exemptions) by the same percentage as before the reform. Thus, the level
of tax evasion falls when the tax base shrinks. We approximate the hybrid
current U.S. tax system by specifying a progressive wage-income tax, a ﬂat
capital-income tax, a ﬂat state income tax, and a ﬂat consumption tax.
Wage Income Taxation
Thew a ge-income tax structure has four elements: (a) a progressive mar-
ginal rate structure derived from a quadratic approximation to the 1996
federal statutory tax rates for individuals; (b) a standard deduction of
$4,000 and exemptions of $5,660 (which assumes 1.2 children per agent,
consistent with the model’s population growth assumption); (c) itemized
deductions—applied only when they exceed the amount of the standard
deduction—that are a positive linear function of income estimated from
data reported in the Statistics of Income;5 and (d) earnings-ability proﬁles
332 Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan Walliser6. Beneﬁts as a function of adjusted gross income were kindly provided by Jane Gravelle
of the Congressional Research Service and Judy Xanthopoulos of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, respectively. On the basis of this information, we regressed total beneﬁts on AGI.
The regression yielded a coeﬃciento f0.11295 with an R2 equal to 0.99. In deﬁning the wage-
tax base, we therefore exempt roughly 11 percent of labor compensation from the base calcu-
lations.
7. The average marginal rate for people with the lowest income exceeds zero due to positive
shadow tax rates in peak earnings years.
that are scaled to incorporate pension and nonpension components of la-
bor compensation.6
Them odel’s initial economy-wide average marginal tax rate on wage
income is about 21 percent, roughly the ﬁgure obtained from NBER’s
TAXSIM model as reported in Auerbach (1996). The average wage-
income tax rate equals 12.1 percent. For all individuals in the highest life-
time income class (group 12), the average eﬀective marginal tax rate on la-
bor income is 28.6 percent. The highest realized eﬀective marginal tax rate
is 34 percent. For lifetime income class six—whose members have peak
labor earnings of about $35,000—the average tax rate and average mar-
ginal tax rate are 10.6 and 20.0 percent, respectively. For the poorest class
(group one), the corresponding rates are zero and 5.5 percent.7
Capital Income Taxation
Following Auerbach (1996), we assume that income from residential
and nonresidential capital are taxed at ﬂat rates of 6 percent and 26 per-
cent,r espectively. Given the roughly equal amounts of these two forms of
capital, the eﬀective federal marginal tax rate on total capital income is 16
percent. However, this rate applies only to new capital. Existing capital
faces a higher tax rate, which, given depreciation schedules, is estimated
to be 20 percent. We model this gap by assuming that all capital income
faces a 20 percent tax, but that 20 percent of new capital may be expensed,
thereby generating a 16 percent eﬀective rate on new capital.
State Income Taxation
In addition to the federal taxation, both capital and wage income are
subject to a proportional state income tax of 3.7 percent. This value corre-
sponds to the amount of revenue generated by state income taxes in 1996
divided by national income.
Consumption Taxation
Consumption taxes in the initial steady state reﬂect two elements of the
existing tax structure. First we impose an 8.8 percent tax on consumption
expenditures consistent with values reported in the National Income and
Product Accounts on indirectb usiness ande xcise revenues. However, be-
cause contributions to both deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution pen-
sion plans receive consumption tax treatment, we levy an additional 2.5
General Equilibrium Analysis of Social Security 333percent tax on household consumption goods expenditures to account for
the indirect taxation of labor compensation in the form of pension beneﬁts
(Auerbach 1996). This 2.5 percent tax replaces the wage tax that otherwise
would apply to labor compensation in the form of fringe beneﬁts.
8.3.5 Social Security, Medicare, and Disability
Them odel has a social insurance system that incorporates Social Secu-
rity Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Social Security Disability
Insurance (DI), and public health insurance taking the form of Medicare
(HI). OASI beneﬁts are calculated according to the progressive statutory
bend-point formula. U.S. Social Security beneﬁts are based on a measure
of average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) over a thirty-ﬁve-year work
history. The AIME is converted into a primary insurance amount (PIA) in
accordance with a progressive formula. In particular, the 1996 beneﬁt for-
mula has two bend points. The PIA is calculated as 90 percent of the ﬁrst
$437 of AIME, 32 percent of the next $2,198 of AIME, and 15 percent of
AIME above $2,198. We approximate the beneﬁt formula with a sixth-
order polynomial, which is applied to the dollar-scaled AIME generated
by the model. This polynomial approximation is very accurate with R2 
0.99. We achieve replacement values between 25 and 75 percent for the
lifetime richest and lifetime poorest, respectively. Since approximately 50
percent of Social Security beneﬁts are paid to survivors and spouses, we
multiply beneﬁts by a factor of two.
In ignoring spousal beneﬁts and the fact that the rich live longer than
the poor, we may be overstating the program’s degree of progressivity.
Thep apers by Liebman and by Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (chap-
ters 1 and 5 in this volume) investigate how these factors inﬂuence pro-
gressivity.
An earmarked tax applied to wage income up to a limit of $62,700—





s,t)a sthe wage income earned by the j-type agent who is age
s in year t. Also deﬁne  j
65,t as the average indexed annual earnings for the
j-type agent aged sixty-ﬁve at time t.L abor income earned before turning
ages ixty-ﬁve is adjusted upward by the growth rate of the economy in
calculating  j
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where R(	)i sthe statutory replacement rate function.
Budget balance for a self-ﬁnancing PAYGO Social Security system with
earmarked taxes at time t requires:
334 Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan WalliserFig. 8.1 Payroll tax ﬁnance of transition8. The employer-employee combined payroll tax equaled 10.52 percentage points. About
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Thev alue of  is solved for endogenously as a function of beneﬁt rules via
equation (6). The value of  is 9.9 percent in the initial steady state, which
is close to its actual value in 1996.8
The net marginal tax rate is a component of the consumer’s ﬁrst-order
conditions. Let PVT( j
s,t)a n dPVB( j
s,t)b ethe present value of payroll
taxes and beneﬁts, respectively, for the j-type agent age s at time t.T h enet





























where PVB(	)  ∂ PVB(	)/∂ and PVT(	)  ∂ PVT(	)/∂w.T he simula-
tions presented herein assume full perception—that is, that agents cor-
rectly foresee how the payroll taxes they pay relate to their future beneﬁts.
Simulations for the no-perception case can be found in Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters,
and Walliser (1999a). Under full perception, the net marginal tax rates are
typically relatively higher for both richer and younger agents. The higher
rates for richer agents reﬂect the progressive manner in which Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts are calculated. The higher rates for younger agents reﬂect the
compound interest eﬀect ofb e i n gr e q uired to save in a Social Security
system whose internal rate of return is less than after-tax rate of return to
capital (reported below). Rich agents whose labor income exceeds the pay-
roll tax face a zero marginal tax rate.
The HI and DI programs are modeled very simply. The HI and DI levels
of lump-sum transfers are picked to generate payroll tax rates of 2.9 per-
cent and 1.9 percent, respectively, corresponding to their 1996 statutory
rates. Like the OASI taxes, DI contributions apply only to wages below
$62,700. The HI tax, in contrast, is not subject to an earnings ceiling.
Lump-sum HI and DI beneﬁts are provided on an equal basis to agents
above and belowa g es i x ty-ﬁve, respectively. In the simulations using the
new model, we have updated the payroll tax rates and payroll tax ceiling
to their 1999 values.
8.3.6 Aggregation and Technology
Aggregate capital (K)a n dl a bor (L)a re obtained from individual asset
and labor supplies as
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Output (net of depreciation) is produced by identical competitive ﬁrms
using a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. The
aggregate production technology is the standard Cobb-Douglas form
(10) YA K L tt t =
−  1 ,
where Yt is aggregate output (national income) and  is capital’s share
in production. Denote the capital-labor ratio as .T he time-t competitive
















where qt  (1 – ztK
t )i sT obin’s q at time t and z is the level of capital in-
vestment expensing.
Given our parameter choices, the nondemographic version of the
AKSW Model generates a pretax interest rate of 9.3 percent, a net na-
tional saving rate of 5.3 percent, and a capital/national-income ratio of 2.6.
Consumption accounts for 73.4 percent of national income, net invest-
ment for 5.2 percent, and government purchases of goods and services for
21.4 percent. These ﬁgures are close to their respective 1996 NIPA values.
Thep o sttax interest rate equals 0.08 and is calculated following Auer-
bach (1996).
8.3.7 Solving the Model
Them odel uses a Gauss-Seidel algorithm to solve for the perfect fore-
sight general equilibrium transition path of the economy. The calculation
starts with a guess for certain key variables and then iterates on those
variables until a convergence criterion is met. The solution involves several
steps and inner loops that solve for household-level variables before mov-
ing to an outer loop that solves for the time paths of aggregate variables
and factor prices.
Our optimization problem includes the constraint that leisure not ex-
ceed the endowment of time (equation [2]). For those households who
would violate the constraint, the model calculates shadow wage rates at
which they exactly consume their full-time endowment. The household’s
budget constraint is kinked due to the tax deductions applied against wage
income. A household with wage income below the deduction level faces
marginal and average tax rates equal to zero. A household with wage in-
come above the deduction level faces positive marginal and average tax
General Equilibrium Analysis of Social Security 3379. Note that the Social Security replacement rate and absolute level of Medicare beneﬁts
are exogenous.
rates. Due to the discontinuity of the marginal tax rates, it may be optimal
for someh ouseholds to locate exactly at the kink. Our algorithm deals
with this problem as follows. We identify households that choose to locate
at the kink by evaluating their leisure choice and corresponding wage in-
come above and below the kink. We then calculate a shadow marginal tax
rate from the ﬁrst-order conditions that puts those households exactly at
the kink. This procedure generates optimal forward-looking leisure and
consumption choices for all periods of life.
Thep ayroll tax ceiling introduces additional complexity by creating a
nonconvexity in the budget constraint. For those above the payroll tax
ceiling, the marginal tax rate on labor falls to zero. We evaluate the utility
on both sides of the nonconvex section and put households on the side
that generates highest utility.
Thes equence of calculations follows: An initial guess is made for the
time paths of aggregate factor supplies as well as for the shadow wage
rates; shadow tax rates; endogenous tax rates; the separate OASI, DI, and
HI payroll tax rates; and the Social Security and Medicare wealth levels.
Thec orresponding factor prices are calculated along with the forward-
looking consumption, asset, and leisure choices for all income classes in
each current and future cohort. Shadow wages and shadow taxes are calcu-
lated to ensure that the time endowment and the tax constraints discussed
abovea re satisﬁed. Households’ labor supplies and assets are then aggre-
gated by both age and lifetime income class at each period in time. This
aggregation generates a new guess for the time paths of the capital stock
and labor supply. The tax rate, which is endogenous for the particular
simulation, is updated to meet the relevant revenue requirement. OASI,
HI, and DI payroll tax rates are also updated to preserve the PAYGO
ﬁnancing of these beneﬁts.9 The new supplies of capital and labor gener-
ated by the household sector of our model are weighted on an annual basis
with the initial guess of these supplies to form a new guess of the time
path of these variables. The algorithm then iterates until the capital stock
and labor supply time paths converge.
8.4 Simulation Results
This section describes the results of six simulations. Additional simula-
tions, which are presented in the next section, include some preliminary
results of our model with enhanced demographics. The label “Year of
Birth” in the tables and ﬁgures refers to the year of an agent’s birth relative
to the year the reform begins. Thus, for example, the index “10” refers
toap e r s o nborn ten years before the reform. The index “1” refers to a
person born the year the reform begins.
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Simulations 1 through 3 study how diﬀerent methods of ﬁnancing the
transition to a privatized Social Security system aﬀect the macroeconomy,
diﬀerent cohorts, and diﬀerent lifetime income classes within each cohort.
In these simulations, participation in the new system is mandatory, and
privatization entails (a) having workers contribute to private accounts, (b)
paying retirees and workers in retirement those Social Security beneﬁts
that they had accrued as of the time of the reform, and (c) ﬁnancing these
accrued Social Security beneﬁts during the transition with either a payroll
tax, an income tax, or a consumption tax.
Since our model does not include liquidity constraints, privatizing Social
Security contributions simply requires setting the model’s Social Secur-
ityp ayroll tax rate to zero. Since agents are able to borrow against any
government-stipulated saving, there is no mechanical need to add a formal
private pension system to the model to which workers are forced to con-
tribute. Doing so would not change any agents’ labor supply or consump-
tion behavior. This said, it is worth noting that in the particular economies
simulated here, only the poorest 10 percent of agents actually seek to bor-
row against their future Social Security beneﬁts. Hence, prohibiting bor-
rowing in our model would not materially alter our ﬁndings.
To provide existing retirees at the time of the reform their full accrued
beneﬁts, we wait ten years until after the reform is announced to start
phasing out Social Security beneﬁts. Since beneﬁts in the economy’s initial
steady state are provided for the ten years between agents’ ages forty-six
and ﬁfty-ﬁve, the ten-year delay in cutting beneﬁts permits the ten initial
generations of retirees to receive the same beneﬁts they would have en-
joyed absent the reform. Starting in the eleventh year of the reform, bene-
ﬁtsa re phased out by 2.2 percent (of the baseline beneﬁts) per year for
forty-ﬁve years. This phase-out pattern is designed to approximate the pro-
vision to initial workers of the full value in retirement of those beneﬁts
they had accrued as of the time of the reform.
In simulations 1 and 3, which use, respectively, a payroll tax and a con-
sumption tax to ﬁnance beneﬁts, the tax rates applied are proportional.
Simulation 2 raises progressive income tax rates to ﬁnance transition bene-
ﬁts. This is accomplished by increasing the two components of the income
tax, the progressive wage tax and the proportional capital income tax, so
that the average wage tax and the average capital income tax change pro-
portionally. The macroeconomic changes in factor supplies along the econ-
omy’s transition path alter the income tax base used to ﬁnance government
purchases. In order to maintain a constant level of government purchases
per eﬀective workeri ne ach transition, we adjust income tax rates along
the transition path even in those simulations in which income taxes are
notu sed to pay the beneﬁts accrued under Social Security.
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Thet op panels of ﬁgures 8.1 through 8.3 and the ﬁrst three rows of
tables 8.1 through 8.5 show the macroeconomic impact of the three alter-
native methods of ﬁnancing the transition. In tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3, the
capital stock, labor supply, and output are measured per twenty-one-year-
old. In simulations 1 through 6, which are generated by our base model
discussed above, the percentage changes are relative to the initial steady-
state values of the variables in question.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that all three simulations generate the same
long-run outcome. This is to be expected, since in the long run Social
Security is fully phased out and the tax used to pay for beneﬁts during
the transition equals zero. The long-run economic impact is considerable.
Compared to the initial steady state, the economy’s capital stock ends up
39.0 percent higher, its labor supply 5.5 percent higher, and its output 13.0
percent higher. The relative changes in factor supplies eﬀect a 7.1 percent
rise in the long-run real wage rate and an 18.6 percent decline in the inter-
est rate.
Although all three policies do the same long-run macroeconomic good,
they diﬀer markedly with respect to their short-run macroeconomic im-
pact and the speed with which they approach their common steady state.
Consumption tax ﬁnance, by imposing a relatively heavy burden on the
initial elderly (who have the highest consumption propensities due to their
proximity to their terminal state), crowds in capital formation from the
initiation of the reform onward. In contrast, wage taxation generates es-
sentially no additional capital formation during the ﬁrst decade of the pol-
icy. Indeed, even after twenty-ﬁve years, the capital stock is only 5.2 per-
cent larger than its initial value. Income tax ﬁnance of the transition is
even worse on this score. It actually reduces the capital stock for more
than a quarter of a century after the reform begins. At the quarter-century
mark, the capital stock is 4.6 lower than its starting value. The diﬀerences
in these results are quite striking and serve as an important lesson to those
advocating privatization. However, most proposals to privatize Social Se-
curity, which, incidentally, do not rely on consumption-tax ﬁnance, may
still entail rapid attainment toward the new steady state if they phase out
beneﬁts under the old system at a faster rate. The trade-oﬀ,h o w ever, is
that this might cause greater harm to initial retirees and workers.
Welfare and Distributional Eﬀects
Theb ottom panels of ﬁgures 8.1–8.3 and the ﬁrst three sections of table
8.6 show the winners and losers within and across generations of the three
alternative ways of ﬁnancing the transition. The ﬁrst thing to note is that
all agents alive in the long run, regardless of their lifetime income class,
areb etter oﬀ as a result of Social Security’s privatization. The welfare
340 Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan WalliserFig. 8.2 Income tax ﬁnance of transitionFig. 8.3 Consumption tax ﬁnance of transitiongains—measured as full remaining lifetime wealth equivalent variations—
varyf rom 6.0 percent for the lowest lifetime earners, to over 8 percent for
the middle- and upper-income lifetime earnings, to only 4.4 percent for
the highest lifetime earners. Hence, Social Security’s privatization im-
proves the welfare across all income classes for those born in the long run
and is, broadly speaking, progressive when measured with respect to its
Table 8.2 Percentage Change in Labor Supply
Year of Transition
Run Experiment Transition Tax 5 10 25 150
1P r i vatization W 1.1 1.1 1.8 5.5
2 Privatization Y 4.5 4.7 0.0 5.5
3 Privatization C 0.3 0.4 2.4 5.5
4 Voluntary privatization C 0.2 0.0 2.4 5.5
4 Voluntary privatization C 0.8 0.8 0.9 5.5
5P rivatization with ﬂat Y 4.7 4.9 2.9 1.2
beneﬁt
6 Privatization with Y 6.7 7.3 3.0 4.0
progressive match
7* Current policy in demo W 3.8 1.8 2.5 4.4
model
8* Privatization in demo W 3.6 1.6 5.4 5.0
model
Notes: C  consumption tax. W  payroll tax. Y  income tax. All runs are relative to initial steady
state except for starred runs, which are relative to year one.
Table 8.1 Percentage Change in Capital Stock
Year of Transition
Run Experiment Transition Tax 5 10 25 150
1P rivatization W 0.0 0.1 5.2 39.0
2P r i vatization Y 2.4 5.0 4.6 39.0
3 Privatization C 1.8 4.1 12.8 39.0
4 Voluntary privatization C 1.5 3.8 14.2 39.0
4 Voluntary privatization C 1.5 3.5 11.0 39.0
5P rivatization with ﬂat beneﬁt Y 2.8 5.7 8.7 12.4
6 Privatization with progressive Y 3.4 7.1 9.7 35.4
match
7* Current policy in demo W 5.9 19.3 52.7 26.0
model
8* Privatization in demo model W 6.9 21.9 61.8 112.1
Notes: C  consumption tax. W  payroll tax. Y  income tax. All runs are relative to initial steady
state except for starred runs, which are relative to year one.
General Equilibrium Analysis of Social Security 343long-run welfare eﬀects. This may seem surprising, given that Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts are very progressive, and one might think that losing them
should be very important to the lifetime poor. However, the opportunity
cost of investing in Social Security is quite high even for a poor person
because its internal rate of return is quite low relative to the private market
return. Moreover, the system’s taxes are regressive due to the ceiling on
Table 8.4 Percentage Change in Wages
Tax that Finances Year of Transition
Accrued Social
RunE xperiment Security Beneﬁts 5 10 25 150
1P r i vatization W 0.4 0.5 0.8 7.1
2P r i vatization Y 0.5 0.0 1.0 7.1
3 Privatization C 0.4 0.9 2.4 7.1
4 Voluntary privatization C 0.4 0.9 2.8 7.1
4 Voluntary privatization C 0.2 0.7 2.4 7.1
5P rivatization with ﬂat Y 0.5 0.2 1.5 2.7
beneﬁt
6 Privatization with prog Y 0.9 0.1 1.8 6.8
match
7* Current policy in demo W 2.4 5.0 10.5 7.1
model
8* Privatization in demo W 2.6 5.4 11.3 19.2
model
Notes: C  consumption tax. W  payroll tax. Y  income tax. All runs are relative to initial steady
state except for starred runs, which are relative to year one.
Table 8.3 Percentage Change in Income
Tax that Finances Year of Transition
Accrued Social
RunE xperiment Security Beneﬁts 5 10 25 150
1P r i vatization W 0.8 0.7 2.6 13.0
2 Privatization Y 4.0 4.8 1.5 13.0
3 Privatization C 0.6 1.3 4.9 13.0
4 Voluntary privatization C 0.2 1.0 5.2 13.0
4 Voluntary privatization C 1.0 1.5 3.3 13.0
5P rivatization with ﬂat Y 4.2 5.1 4.4 3.9
beneﬁt
6 Privatization with prog Y 5.9 7.2 4.7 11.1
match
7* Current policy in demo W 1.5 3.1 13.3 2.4
model
8* Privatization in demo W 1.1 3.8 17.3 25.2
model
Notes: C  consumption tax. W  payroll tax. Y  income tax. All runs are relative to initial steady
state except for starred runs, which are relative to year one.
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Year of Birth
Class 54 25 10 1 10 25 150
Run 1
1 0.0 2.0 1.3 0.6 0.1 2.2 6.0
3 0.1 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.5 3.0 7.4
6 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.8 3.3 8.0
9 0.1 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.9 3.5 8.1
12 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.5 4.4
Run 2
1 0.1 0.2 1.6 3.2 3.1 3.5 6.0
3 1.4 1.6 0.0 1.4 1.7 3.3 7.4
6 1.3 2.1 0.7 0.7 1.1 3.2 8.0
9 1.2 2.4 1.0 0.3 0.8 3.1 8.1
12 1.7 3.6 3.6 3.0 2.5 0.2 4.4
Run 3
1 0.7 2.1 0.6 0.5 1.3 3.2 6.0
3 0.4 2.0 0.0 1.2 2.1 4.2 7.4
6 0.9 1.7 0.3 1.6 2.6 4.8 8.0
9 1.2 1.6 0.5 1.7 2.7 4.9 8.1
12 1.5 2.5 1.8 1.0 0.1 1.7 4.4
Run 4
1 0.5 2.2 1.0 0.9 1.6 4.2 6.0
3 0.3 2.7 0.2 1.6 2.4 5.2 7.4
Table 8.5 Percentage Change in Interest Rates
Tax that Finances Year of Transition
Accrued Social
RunE xperiment Security Beneﬁts 5 10 25 150
1P r i vatization W 1.0 1.4 2.5 18.6
2 Privatization Y 1.5 0.0 3.2 18.6
3 Privatization C 1.1 2.7 6.9 18.6
4 Voluntary privatization C 1.2 2.7 7.8 18.6
4 Voluntary privatization C 0.5 1.9 6.8 18.6
5 Privatization with ﬂat Y 1.4 0.6 4.7 7.6
beneﬁt
6 Privatization with prog Y 2.6 0.2 5.4 17.9
match
7* Current policy in demo W 7.0 13.6 25.9 18.8
model
8* Privatization in demo W 7.5 14.8 27.5 41.1
model
Notes: C  consumption tax. W  payroll tax. Y  income tax. All runs are relative to initial steady
state except for starred runs, which are relative to year one.
(continued)taxable earnings. The poor beneﬁt more than the very rich from the priva-
tization of Social Security because the regressiveness of the payroll tax
outweighs the progressivity of the beneﬁt schedule.
While everyone alive in the long run wins due to the privatization of
Social Security, their winnings come at the price of reduced welfare for
initial and intermediate generations. However, the diﬀerent ﬁnancing
mechanisms spread out the transitional losses quite diﬀerently. Consump-
tion tax ﬁnancing (simulation 3) is hard on initial older generations be-
cause it raises resource using a wealth levy. Increasing progressive tax rates
(simulation 2), however, hits them even harder. The wage tax transition is
the least painful for the oldest retirees alive at the time of the reform, as
they pay no wage taxes. Despite the fact that funding Social Security is
simplyar e distribution mechanism between generations that does not im-
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Table 8.6 (continued)
Year of Birth
Class 54 25 10 1 10 25 150
6 0.6 2.8 0.3 2.0 2.9 5.8 8.0
9 0.8 2.8 0.5 2.2 3.1 5.9 8.1
12 1.0 2.9 1.6 0.6 0.1 2.5 4.4
Run 4
1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.5 1.0 2.8 6.0
3 0.2 1.3 0.5 1.2 1.8 3.8 7.4
6 0.6 1.4 0.1 1.7 2.2 4.3 8.0
9 0.8 1.4 0.3 1.8 2.4 4.4 8.1
12 1.0 2.3 1.7 0.9 0.4 1.3 4.4
Run 5
1 0.1 1.8 3.1 4.3 4.1 4.2 5.7
3 1.4 0.5 0.6 1.7 1.7 2.3 4.8
6 1.3 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.4 4.4
9 1.2 2.1 1.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 4.1
12 1.7 3.6 3.9 3.4 3.5 3.4 0.5
Run 6
1 0.2 0.9 3.2 5.3 5.0 5.3 8.0
3 1.8 1.3 0.7 2.6 2.7 4.2 8.4
6 1.6 2.4 1.0 0.7 0.9 2.9 8.1
9 1.6 3.2 1.8 0.4 0.1 2.2 7.7
12 2.1 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.1 1.7 3.5
Run 8*
1 0.01 2.36 2.29 1.49 0.88 2.11 7.68
3 0.01 1.86 1.76 1.12 0.46 2.53 8.26
6 0.02 1.41 1.22 0.57 0.25 3.47 9.60
9 0.02 1.17 0.95 0.33 0.54 3.79 9.94
12 0.03 0.37 0.18 0.06 0.45 1.89 5.99
Note: All runs are relative to initial steady state except starred run, which is relative to utility under the
current policy transition.prove eﬃciency (that is, unless people do not perceive their Social Security
tax-beneﬁt linkage properly), it can be shown that greater funding can
increase social welfare provided that the social welfare function places
enough weight on the utility of future generations (Feldstein 1995, 1998).
This is an important point for policy makers to keep in mind, because they
inﬂuence the distribution of resources across generations.
8.4.2 Making Privatization Voluntary
A mandatory privatization plan may face less chance of being enacted
than one that provides workers the choice to simply opt out of Social
Security. Indeed, most actual privatizations have given people the choice.
This was true, for example, in Chile and Argentina, and in the case of
other major reforms in Latin America; only new workers were forced into
the new system. In the United Kingdom, even new workers are allowed to
choose between the traditional public pension system and private ac-
counts. Allowing for choice leads those agents whose present valueso f
future Social Security taxes (PVT) exceed the presentv alue of their future
beneﬁts (PVB) (including beneﬁts already accrued) to opt out of the ex-
isting system.
Permitting voluntary exit from Social Security involves three elements:
(a) eliminating both future payroll taxation as well as all future beneﬁt
claims for those who opt out, (b) collecting payroll taxes from and pay-
ing beneﬁts to those who stay in, and (c) using general revenue to ﬁnance
the gap between payroll taxes collected and beneﬁts received. Agents who
stay in Social Security face the same payroll tax rate and receive the same
beneﬁts that they would under current law. Agents endogenously decide
whether or not it is better for them to opt out of Social Security, taking
into account the entire future path of factor prices and tax rates. Since the
opting-out decision of one agent aﬀects the decision of other agents via
changes in factor prices, the simulation iterates until a ﬁnal competitive
(Nash) equilibrium is arrived at.
Providing workers with the option to leave Social Security may sound
more generous than forcing them to leave with only their accrued beneﬁts,
but the opposite is actually the case. Consider ﬁrst those who opt out of
Social Security. In so doing, they forfeit all the beneﬁts they have accrued
up to that point in their working careers. Hence, compared with compul-
sory privatization, which guarantees the full value of accrued beneﬁts, vol-
untary privatization is less generous. Next, consider those who decide to
stay in the old system. In so doing, they ensure that they will receive their
past accrued beneﬁts (also provided by a compulsory system), but the
price for so doing is staying in a system which, at the margin, may repre-
sentanet tax: For those remaining in the old system, each dollar contrib-
uted in the future may deliver additional beneﬁts that total less than a
dollar in expectedp r esent value.
In the actual simulation, the loss of their accrued beneﬁts leads most
General Equilibrium Analysis of Social Security 347existing workers to remain in the old system. On the other hand, all agents
younger than twenty-ﬁve years of (real-life) age opt out, as do all future
agents. Since the System’s beneﬁts are provided on a progressive basis, one
would expect the opting-out cutoﬀ agef or high earners to be larger than
that for low earners. This indeed turns out to be the case. High earners in
their mid-thirties choose to opt out, whereas the poorest agents opt out
only through age twenty-seven.
Macroeconomic Eﬀects
To be sure, only a fraction of initial workers voluntarily leave the Social
Security System under opting-out, which means that they will eventually
collect full beneﬁts, whereas they would have collected only partial beneﬁts
under the forced phase-out considered earlier. However, those that do
leavef orfeittheirrighttocollectanyfutureSocialSecuritybeneﬁts,whereas
they would have collected at least some beneﬁts under the forced privatiza-
tion plan considered earlier. On net, the aggregate decrease in Social Secu-
rity wealth is about the same over time between the two options. This is
shown in simulation 4, which reports the results seen when agents are given
the choice to remain in the current system or to opt out. The transition,
whichi sdepicted in ﬁgure 8.4, is ﬁnanced via a consumption tax, similar
to simulation 3, that forces participation. Notice that the intermediate im-
pact on macroeconomic variables is about the same for both simulations.
For the case of income tax ﬁnancing (not shown), opting out outperforms
forced participation.
Welfare and Distribution
Compared with forced participation, opting out does a slightly better
job of protecting the welfare of the initial elderly. Whereas the welfare of
oldest agents alive at the time of the reform in income class 6 is reduced
by 0.9 percent in simulation 3, it is reduced by 0.6 percent in simulation
4. For members of income class 12, who hold even more wealth and there-
fore are evenm oree xposed to the wealth levy associated with consumption
tax ﬁnancing, these values are 1.5 percent and 1.0 percent, respectively.
Opting out leads to a smaller need to increase consumption taxes immedi-
ately, because some payroll tax revenue is still being collected from those
whor e main in Social Security. Opting out, however, leaves middle-aged
agents alive at the time of the reform (e.g., those born in year of birth –25)
because many of them choose to remain in Social Security (and, therefore,
payahigh payroll tax) and must help pay for, via a consumption tax, the
revenue that is lost when younger and higher-earning workers opt out of
Social Security.
To address the welfare impact that opting out has on middle-aged work-
ers alive at the time of the reform, simulation 4 considers the same
opting-out experiment but with a “plus”: Workers who remain in Social
Security must pay only half the current tax rate. The immediate payroll
348 Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan WalliserFig. 8.4 Opting out with new payroll tax equal to present law value, consumption
tax ﬁnance of transitiontax revenue lost from this policy change is oﬀset, in large part, by the
decrease in the number of workers choosing to opt out. Eventually all new
workers, however, choose not to participate in Social Security, even at a
reduced payroll tax rate, because the rate of return they can receive in the
capital market is suﬃciently higher than the internal rate of return to So-
cial Security. The net eﬀecto fthis policy change is to reduce the revenue
collected from those alive at the time of the reform and therefore push
more of the burden toward future generations. This is why simulation 4
leads to a slower transition relative to simulations 3 and 4, as shown in
the tables. However, on the distributional side, simulation 4 more evenly
distributes the burden associated with privatization, both over time and
across lifetime income groups. While the utility of a middle-aged agent
(born in year 25) of income class 1 decreases by 2.1 percent in simulation
3, it decreases by only 0.8 percent in simulation 4.T his change comes,
in part, at the cost of future transitional workers, who gain from privatiza-
tion in both cases, but less so in simulation 4.
8.4.3 Privatization with a Flat Beneﬁt
TheW orld Bank has, in the past, encouraged developing countries to
include a “ﬁrst pillar” as part of their reforms. This ﬁrst pillar is a ﬂat
beneﬁt that is received by all workers independent of their contribution
level. Although an attempt to protect the poor, the ﬁrst pillar has two
major drawbacks. First, the tax used for its ﬁnance adds a work disincen-
tive.S econd, the ﬂat beneﬁt is typically ﬁnanced on a PAYGO basis and
therefore vitiates most of the potential long-run gains from privatizing the
old system. We investigate this policy by (a) providing a wage-indexed ﬂat
minimum annual beneﬁt that equals $6,000, (b) paying a weighted average
of the old OASI and the new ﬂat minimum beneﬁt during the transition,
and (c) ﬁnancing the transition with a progressive income tax.
As tables 8.1 and 8.2 and ﬁgure 8.5 indicate, the long-run increases in
capital and labor under this policy are less than one-third of their values
in the absence of a ﬂat minimum beneﬁt. Furthermore, the added work
disincentives associated with ﬁnancing the minimum beneﬁt reduce labor
supply by almost 3 percent after the ﬁrst twenty-ﬁve years of the transi-
tion,c omparedt on or eduction fors imulation 2. Less labor supply trans-
lates into less saving by workers, less national saving, and less domestic
investment. Indeed, in the twenty-ﬁfth year of this policy, the economy’s
capital stock and output are, respectively, 8.7 percent and 4.4 percent be-
low their initial values.
How does adding a ﬂat beneﬁt to an income tax–ﬁnanced policy alter
the well-being of the poor in the long run? The surprising answer, provided
in the ﬁfth section of table 8.6, is that makes them worse oﬀ relative
to privatization without the ﬂat beneﬁt. In the long run, the welfare of
the poorest earners is 5.7 percent higher than in the initial steady state,
350 Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan WalliserFig. 8.5 Flat minimum beneﬁt with income tax ﬁnancewhereas without a ﬂat beneﬁt (simulation 2), it is 6.0 percent higher. Al-
though the ﬂat beneﬁt harms the long-run poor, it substantially improves
the well-being of the initial poor. For example, those members of the low-
este a rnings class who are born ten years before the policy is enacted enjoy
a3.1percentimprovementinwelfareinsimulation5comparedtoa1.6per-
cent improvement in simulation 2. In contrast to the long-run poor, who
areo nly mildly harmed by the ﬂat beneﬁt, the long-run middle class and
richa re substantially harmed. For the long-run highest earners, welfare
rises by only 0.5 percent ins i m ulation 5, compared to 4.4 percent in simu-
lation 2. For those long-run members of earnings class 6, the ﬂat beneﬁt
lowers the welfare gain from 8.0 percent to 4.4 percent. To summarize, the
inclusion of the ﬂat beneﬁt redistributes from those alive in the long run,
butp articularly from those with higher earnings, toward those who are
poor during the transition.
8.4.4 Privatization with a Progressive Matching Contribution
The plan we consider in this section envisions having the government
match contributions to the privatized system on a progressive basis. The
government’s match is calculated as a function of labor income and falls
steadily as a percentage of earnings, starting at about 5 percent for the
poorest. In absolute terms, it increases from about $470 at annual earnings
of $10,000 to around $840 for annual earnings of $21,000 and remains
constant thereafter. On a lifetime basis, the match provides a transfer to
the poor whose long-run value exceeds the ﬂat minimum beneﬁt by 30
percent. Workers fully incorporate in their labor supply and saving deci-
sions the marginal subsidy associated with the progressive contribution
match. In order to compare the results of this option to those of the ﬂat
beneﬁt, an income tax is used to ﬁnance the transition, including the
match.
As tables 8.1 through 8.5 and ﬁgure 8.6 indicate, this method of helping
the poor leads to the worst short-run macroeconomic outcomes of all the
simulations presented thus far. By yeart wenty-ﬁve, the capital stock is
smaller by 9.7 percent, labor is lower by 3 percent, and national income
is down by 4.7 percent. However, unlike the ﬂat beneﬁt, whose general
equilibrium feedbacks worsen the plight of the long-run poor, the progres-
sive matching contribution raises their welfare by 8 percent in the long
run. The primary sacriﬁcers here are those in the top earnings classes of
their respective cohorts.
Thep rogressive match performs quite well when a consumption tax is
used to ﬁnance the transition (which is not shown here in order to save
space; see Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser 1999a). All of the short-run
and long-run gains to macroeconomic variables are positive and very simi-
lar to those shown in simulation 3, and the long-run gains are substantially
larger relative to using a consumption tax to ﬁnance a ﬂat beneﬁt. For
352 Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan WalliserFig. 8.6 Progressive match with income tax ﬁnanceexample, the capital stock increases by 39 percent under the progressive
match but by only 23 percent under the ﬂat beneﬁt. For national income,
these values are 12.4 and 7.5 percent, respectively. These results conﬁrm
the importance of the choice of the tax base used to ﬁnance the transition.
They also indicate that there are ways to help the long-run poor without
hurting those who are poor in the short run.
8.5 Preliminary and Future Work:
Including More Realistic Demographics
This section outlines how we are currently modifying the model de-
scribed in the previous section. We have already made a large amount of
progress toward this end, but we are not yet satisﬁed enough with the
model’s design and calibration to regard our simulations as ﬁnal. Hence,
we oﬀer the results in this section as a “sneak peek”—but a high-quality
one—into our work at hand.
8.5.1 The New Model
Our current work expands the treatment of demographics in four di-
mensions. First, it permits much more realistic patterns of births. Second,
it permitsam orer e alistic length of life. Third, it permits a more realistic
age-distribution of inheritances. Fourth, it permits the economy to initiate
itst r ansition from arbitrary initial demographic conditions; in other words,
the initial period’s population age distribution is not necessarily stable.
Births and Children
In the new version of the model, children derive utility from consump-
tion and leisure from birth through age twenty-one. These levels of child
utility enter their parents’ utility function in a linearly additive manner.
Thef ormo fthis utility function is identical to that of the adults’. It is a
time separable CES function and runs through the child’s twenty-ﬁrst year
of age. The child utility functions are multiplied by a child-utility prefer-
ence parameter. They are also multiplied by the number, which could be a
fraction, of children per parent. Because parents give birth to children (or,
to be more precise, give birth to fractions of children) at diﬀerent ages,
each parent’s utility function has a child utility function for each of the
diﬀerent ages at which a child is born. Children are assumed to have a
wage of zero prior to reaching age twenty-one. Consequently, they choose
to supply no labor. On the other hand, they do consume when young.
Theirc o nsumption is determined by their parents and enters their parents’
budget constraints.
The new model features a realistic distribution of births by the age of
parents instead of assuming that all children arrive when the parents reach
aget wenty-one. Newborns of each cohort are allocated to adults over age
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in U.S. data. For example, if thirty-year-old females give birth to 5 percent
of newborns each year in the United States, 5 percent of the model’s new-
borns each year are assigned as children to that year’s thirty-year-olds.
There is nothing in the mathematics of our model that precludes adults’
giving birth to fractions of children in a given year. This allows us to avoid
having to separately track those agents in a given cohort who do and do
noth ave children in a given year. Instead, we can focus on the average
agenti nap articular income class and generation.
Length of Life
Average longevity in the United States has increased by about two years
since the original Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) model and will continue
to do so in the future. Thus, the ﬁfty-ﬁve-period model, in which people
arei n dependent economic actors for ﬁfty-ﬁve years, was updated to allow
fors ixty periods, or whatever age the programmer chooses. We are in the
process of indexing this age to the year index, so that longevity can in-
crease over time. We may also make longevity diﬀer by income class if we
canﬁ nd suitable empirical data to match. As it stands now, an agent is an
independent actor for sixty years, which means that agents live for a total
of eighty-one years (the ﬁrst twenty-one years as dependents).
Inheritances
Ap arent’s utility from bequests is also modiﬁed in the new version of
the model. Speciﬁcally, this utility is multiplied by the number of children
the parent has when he or she reaches the maximum age of life and passes
on.H owever, all recipients of bequests are no longer the same age. Instead,
we assume that decedents divide their bequests evenly among all their oﬀ-
spring and that their oﬀspring receive these inheritances at whatever age
they have achieved as of the time of the parent’s death.
Calibration
In calibrating the new model’s demographics, we use the Social Security
Administration’s projections of aggregate annual births to determine the
size of each successive cohort. In addition, we use the current age distribu-
tion of the U.S. population to populate our model in the ﬁrst year of the
transition. We do not assume a stable initial distribution of the U.S. popu-
lation.
We have not yet calibrated the model to our full satisfaction. This in-
cludes fully matching the model’s initial wealth and initial Social Security
beneﬁt distributions to their empirical counterparts. Some of the short-
run results presented below might reﬂect this fact, although the medium-
to long-run results tend to be fairly robust to a reasonable range of choices
for the model’s initial conditions. Also, we currently assume that those in
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the wage distribution, face only the inframarginal Social Security tax in
each period of their lives; consequently, for this group, the marginal Social
Security tax is always zero. All wage groups below the top three are as-
sumed to face the Social Security tax rate at the margin. Although this as-
sumptionis likelytoleadto verylittlebias,we plantoimplement theproce-
dure used in our base model in the near future that takes into account
the kink in the budget constraint arising from the ceiling on payroll taxa-
tion.F inally, the aggregate variables produced by our model are measured
pert wenty-one-year-old. That is, they are normalized by the number of
agents who are who are entering their ﬁrst year of independent economic
activity.
8.5.2 Preliminary Simulation Results
Simulating the Demographic Transition Under Current Policy
Simulation 7 considers how the Social Security system will fare over
time if there is no change in the PAYGO nature of the program. Given the
projected aging of the U.S. economy and the concomitant projected
growth in Social Security beneﬁts, Social Security payroll tax rates will
have to rise if no other ﬁnancing mechanism is put into place. Indeed,
simulation 7, entitled “Current Policy in Demo Model,” eventuates in a 5
percentage point rise in the payroll tax rate. This is the bad news about
the demographic transition. The good, and somewhat surprising, news is
that, notwithstanding Social Security’s problem, the nation’s aging is a
positive thing for the economy overall if we look out to the medium term.
Table 8.3 documents this point. It shows that output per twenty-one-year-
old is 2.5 percent lower ﬁve years from now (year 1 in the simulation), but
12.9 percent higher twenty-ﬁve years from now. In the very long run, after
the nation’s population distribution has stabilized, output per twenty-one-
year-oldi so nly 3.3 percent higher than its current value.
Thee x planation for this unusual growth pattern is the medium-term
capital deepening arising from the large numbers of baby boomers arriving
at retirement with signiﬁcant holdings of capital. Since the work force
coming behind them is relatively small in size, there is a substantial rise in
the capital-labor ratio. For example, in the twenty-ﬁfth year of the transi-
tion, the capital-labor ratio is 47 percent higher than its initial value. This
capital deepening translates into almost a 10 percent rise in the real wage
in the medium term and an 8 percent rise in the real wage in the long term.
Privatization in the Demographic Model
Our ﬁnal simulation, number 8, enacts the privatization policy of simu-
lation 1. Social Security beneﬁts are phased out after ten years, and transi-
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8.1 through 8.5 indicate, compared to the status quo/current policy transi-
tion (simulation 7), privatization in the demographic model (simulation 8)
produces an even more dramatic improvement in the economy’s medium-
as well as long-run positions. According to table 8.3 and the top panel in
ﬁgure 8.7, privatization raises living standards twenty-ﬁve years out by
18.8 percent, and in the long run by 20 percent. Associated with this policy
is a 56 percent increase in the capital-labor ratio by year 25 and a corre-
sponding 11.1 percent rise in real wages. The combination of capital deep-
ening and reduced payroll taxation generates a signiﬁcant medium-term
increase in labor supply. In year 25, labor supply is 7.0 percent above its
initial (year 1) value, compared to only 2.7 percent above in the current-
policy demographic simulation.
Table 8.6 and ﬁgure 8.7 display the welfare eﬀects associated with priva-
tization using wage-tax ﬁnance. Welfare changes are measured relative to
the utility levels that the particular agents in each generations would have
enjoyed under the status-quo (baseline) policy, which is considered in sim-
ulation 7. There are four things here worth emphasizing. First, as in the
nondemographic version of our model (see simulation 1), all lifetime earn-
ings groups alive in the long run experience substantial welfare gains from
Social Security’s privatization. Second, the lifetime poor alive in the long
run experience a much higher welfare gain than do the lifetime rich. Third,
these long-run gains are larger in the nondemographic model because the
long-run payroll tax rate would otherwise be 5 percentage points higher.
Fourth, the short-run welfare losses to initial younger workers are larger
in the demographic model because of the need to pay the retirement bene-
ﬁts of the large baby boom cohorts.
8.6 Conclusion
TheU .S. Social Security system is in trouble. Its projected future expen-
ditures exceed its projected means of paying for those expenditures by
more than one-third. Addressing Social Security’s ﬁscal imbalance is inevi-
table. How it is done will aﬀect current and future generations of Ameri-
cans, not just through their payment of payroll taxes and their receipt of
beneﬁts, but also through the real wages and real rates of return they earn
on their labor supply and savings. Hence, understanding these eﬀects ne-
cessitates a general equilibrium analysis. This paper provides such an anal-
ysis. It shows that privatizing Social Security can generate signiﬁcant long-
run economic gains for the lifetime poor as well as the lifetime rich. How-
ever, achieving these gains comes at the expense of some welfare losses to
transition generations. It also requires patience, since even the best-
designed privatization of Social Security will take years to signiﬁcantly
General Equilibrium Analysis of Social Security 357Fig. 8.7 Payroll tax ﬁnance of transition (demo)aﬀectthe economy. Finally, it requires avoiding ﬂat beneﬁts and other mea-
sures that may seem progressive but that end up doing more harm than
good to those who are poor in the long run.
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Comment James E. Duggan and David W. Wilcox
Thep aper by Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (KSW) represents a prog-
ress report on—and an extension of—a research program of very impres-
sive proportions. Surely, this must be one of the most ambitious simulation
research programs in economics, whether measured in terms of the impor-
tance of the topic, the length of time that the authors have remained with
the project, or the range of features they have incorporated into their
model.
We organize our comment into two main sections. First, we highlight
three speciﬁc observations about various aspects of the paper. Then we
move to am oreg e neral assessment of the adequacy of the basic approach
used by KSW—and countless others—as a means of conducting distribu-
tional analysis of the Social Security system.
Speciﬁc Observations
It is ironic that the last time one of us (Wilcox) had the pleasure of
serving as a discussant at an NBER conference, it was also of a Smetters
paper, the objective of which was to highlight the ﬁnancial risk associated
with ownership of equities. In particular, the earlier Smetters paper argued
that the burden of equity-related risk should be evaluated at the prices
paid by private market participants. Given the important role that equities
play in the current paper, and the striking results reported in the earlier
paper, future eﬀortm ight be directed toward examining whether addi-
tional insights could be gained by marrying these two branches of Smet-
ters’s research.
As econd observation pertains to the use of the word “privatization” in
this paper. The positive welfare eﬀects that obtain in the new steady state
do not stem from linking an individual’s Social Security beneﬁt to the
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investment outcome of an account in that person’s name and under his or
her individual control. Rather, the welfare beneﬁts simply reﬂect the result
demonstrated by Peter Diamond (1965), that when the economy is on the
right side of the golden rule, steady-state utility is higher in a funded sys-
tem than in an unfunded system. In short, the welfare gains estimated by
KSW have nothing to do with “privatization” as most people understand
that term, and all of the beneﬁts outlined by KSW could equally be cap-
tured in a prefunded system that preserves the essential contours of the
current system.1
Finally, we question the characterization of some of the results as dem-
onstrating that “privatization” is “progressive” (see, for example, the dis-
cussion of table 8.6 in section 8.4). It is true that, in most or all of these
simulations, the poor are better oﬀ by more than the top 2 percent of the
population, but they are also better oﬀ by less than everyone else for whom
results are shown. This does not answer to our deﬁnition of a progressive
reform.
The More General Question
In the remainder of this comment, we focus on one element of KSW’s
model, namely the representation in the model of the mechanism that gen-
erates Social Security beneﬁts. The goal will be to assess the adequacy of
the approach taken by KSW, using some administrative data available to
us at the Treasury Department. KSW have enforced some simpliﬁcations
of reality, with the objective of keeping the model computationally and
conceptually tractable. The important question is not whether the model is
simpler than reality—it is—but, rather, whether the simpliﬁcations could
materially aﬀect the conclusions of some analyses KSW might undertake
in the future, recognizing that (a) the authors intend to use the model
to address questions in which general-equilibrium considerations may be
particularly germane, and (b) they also intend to examine (as the title of
their paper states) the distributional eﬀects of various policy experiments.
One common approach in setting up a simulation model is to specify a
small number of worker/beneﬁciaries, each with an exogenous earnings
trajectory. This is the approach that historically has been taken, for ex-
ample, by the Social Security actuaries, with their “steady low earners,”
“steady average earners,” and “steady high earners.”
KSW go one better than this by specifying the lifetime skill proﬁles of
a small number of worker/beneﬁciaries as well as their preferences over
consumption and leisure. Importantly, this allows labor supply to respond
endogenously to changes in factor prices. Nonetheless, individuals with
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(assuming a positive wage rate) and will experience a smooth earnings
trajectory over their lifetimes, much like the ones speciﬁed by the actu-
aries.
Weaknesses of the Typical Approach
At least in its simplest form, the approach taken by KSW and countless
other authors suﬀers from some notable shortcomings, at least for some
purposes: It cannot be used to analyze issues related to gender, because
there is (in the simplest models) no distinction between males and females.
Likewise, it cannot be used to analyze issues related to survivor beneﬁts,
because there is no concept of premature death. Nor can it be used to
analyze issues related to spousal beneﬁts, because there is no concept of
marriage.
Even the ability to examine issues related to income may be more limited
than it ﬁrst appears. For example, labor force attachment is markedly more
intermittent for lower-income workers than for higher-income workers, yet,
in the typical approach, all earnings trajectories show each worker/beneﬁ-
ciaryw ithp ositive earnings every year of working life. Depending on the
question under investigation, this could be a material shortcoming.
Solutions to These Problems
All of the issues raised above could be addressed by increasing (possibly
greatly) the number of earnings trajectories considered. For example,
● To address the issue of gender, one could double the number of trajec-
tories and label half as “women” and the other half as “men.”
● To address the issue of survivor beneﬁts, one could impose an empiri-
cally realistic distribution of death dates for each gender. Some work-
ers would die young, some at intermediate ages, and some in old age.
● To address the issue of spousal beneﬁts, one could allow an empiri-
cally realistic amount of “marriage” to take place, with an appro-
priate matching of age and lifetime-income characteristics.
Thep roper means of addressing the issue of intermittent labor force at-
tachment is less apparent, but a good start might involve building in the
idea that, for many workers, employment is more a binary variable than
continuous. The modiﬁcations that are advertised at the end of the paper
arei n teresting and useful, but will not fundamentally address any of the
issues raised here.
Evaluating the Seriousness of the Problem
Do the simpliﬁcations inherent in the baseline model involve important
loss of accuracy in answering speciﬁc questions? The remainder of this
comment provides some evidence on that question. The results that follow
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tion (SSA): the 1 percent 1996 Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS)
and the Master Beneﬁciary Record (MBR). The CWHS is a record of
1951–96 annual earnings for workers in covered employment, and the
MBR is a record of beneﬁts paid to those workers when they retire (or
become disabled) and to nonworkers who become eligible on the basis of
a worker’s eligibility (spouses, children, etc.). We also utilize data on the
earnings histories of auxiliary beneﬁciaries extracted from SSA’s Master
Earnings File.
We formed a subsample of just over 95,000 retired-worker (76 percent),
spouse (11 percent), and widow (13 percent) beneﬁciaries born during the
years 1924 to 1928. In the spirit of KSW, we classiﬁed observations ac-
cording to the distribution of age-sixty-ﬁve beneﬁts. For those beneﬁciaries
who diedb eforea ge sixty-ﬁve, or who started receiving beneﬁts after age
sixty-ﬁve, we imputed an age-sixty-ﬁve beneﬁt by indexing the beneﬁt clos-
estt othat age based on legislated changes in beneﬁts. Our beneﬁt classiﬁ-
cation scheme mimics the twelve KSW income categories: the ﬁrst two
percentiles, the next eight percentiles, deciles two to nine, the 91st–98th
percentiles, and the top two percentiles. The second column of table 8C.1
shows the means and standard deviations of age-sixty-ﬁve beneﬁts for re-
tired workers by beneﬁt class. (For purposes of this table we omitted
spouses and widows.)
The third column shows, for the same subsample, the beneﬁt amounts
that would be paid based on the mean earnings trajectory for each beneﬁt
class. The greatest discrepancies between the second and third columns oc-
cur at the lower and top beneﬁt classes.
It is interesting to note that the beneﬁt classes are demographically very
nonhomogeneous. For example, ﬁgure 8C.1 shows the distribution of
males and females by beneﬁt class based on actual beneﬁts. Most women
arei nthe lower end of the distribution and most men in the upper end.
This suggests that Social Security reforms that aﬀect diﬀerent income
classes diﬀerently will also aﬀect men andw o m e nd i ﬀerently.
We constructed age-earnings proﬁles for the beneﬁciary sample de-
scribed abovef or ages twenty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve using actual historical cov-
ered earnings data from the CWHS for primary workers and from the
SSA’s Master Earnings File for auxiliary beneﬁciaries. Figure 8C.2 shows
these proﬁles for three beneﬁciary classes, the ﬁrst two percentiles, the 5th
decile, and the top two percentiles. The diﬀerences in magnitude and
shape are remarkable, even if expected. Earnings for the top beneﬁt class
peak past age sixty, but ten to ﬁfteen years earlier for the ﬁrst and ﬁfth
classes. Of course, there is no reason that the underlying structure of
KSW’s model should not closely resemble these results.
Them orep ressing issue is that mean age-earnings proﬁles may obscure
important underlying labor force patterns, and—interacting with a highly
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Table 8C.1 Age-65 Social Security Beneﬁt Distribution (1999 dollars)
Mean Actual Beneﬁt in $ Beneﬁt Based on Mean
Beneﬁt Class (Standard Deviation) Earnings Trajectory (in $)
1st and 2nd percentiles 1,234 2,227
(334)
3rd–10th percentiles 2,767 2,423
(591)
2rd decile 4,446 3,427
(335)
3th decile 5,330 4,038
(200)
4th decile 6,135 5,489
(290)
5th decile 7,276 6,426
(358)
6th decile 8,645 7,994
(423)
7th decile 10,038 9,460
(382)
8th decile 11,245 11,784
(294)
9th decile 12,417 12,752
(493)
91st–98th percentiles 14,465 14,167
(629)
Top2p ercentiles 16,766 14,846
(1,303)nonlinear beneﬁt system—may generate misleading results. As we noted
above, low-income individuals generally exhibit more intermittent labor
force participation than higher-income individuals.T his can be seen in
ﬁgure 8C.3, which shows the diﬀerential incidence of years with zero earn-
ings across the beneﬁt classes, limiting the computation to the highest
thirty-eight years of earnings. The percentage is very high for the lowest
beneﬁt classes but relatively small for the highest classes. Separate results
form en and women (not shown) suggest that women have a higher inci-
dence than men of years with no earnings, especially in the upper beneﬁt
classes.
Of course, the real issue of interest is whether the considerations we
have raised suggest that some distributional analysis might be materially
distorted. As a case study for this question, we have examined the distribu-
tional impact of increasing the number of years’ worth of earnings in-
cluded in the beneﬁt formula from thirty-ﬁve to thirty-eight. (This change
to the system has been a feature of many congressional and think-tank
proposals for Social Security reform.) While this oft-proposed change in
the beneﬁt formula provides a convenient vehicle for illustrating our point,
it is probably not the most consequential example. For example, the same
types of eﬀects would emerge in proposals to create individual accounts if
the contribution into the account is zero unless annual earnings exceed
some nonzero threshold.
The eﬀecto nworker beneﬁts of such a change depends on whether it
causes more low earnings to be added to the AIME and on the level of
AIME. Workers with steady earnings in all years would be unaﬀected.
Fig. 8C.2 Real age-earnings proﬁles by beneﬁt class
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Workers with low or zero earnings for the thirty-sixth through thirty-
eighth years, on the other hand, would be aﬀected most. Due to the pro-
gressive structure of the beneﬁt formula, changes in the AIME result in
larger changes for beneﬁciaries with low earnings and conversely for high
earners.
We evaluated the eﬀects of such a proposal on over 14,000 retired work-
ers born in 1928 by ﬁrst computing age-sixty-ﬁve retirement beneﬁts un-
der current law and then recomputing those beneﬁts with the computa-
tion period increased by three years. Our results for males and females
are summarized in ﬁgure 8C.4. Beneﬁt reductions are uniformly higher
forf e males than for males and larger for low- than for high-beneﬁciary
classes.
Conclusion
We believe that the results described above illustrate a generic short-
coming of simulation models based on a very limited representation of
heterogeneity in the population. To be clear, we believe that KSW have
taken a useful step in introducing heterogeneity into their model. An inter-
esting question—the answer to which we do not know—is whether at the
current stage they have achieved only an uncomfortable middle ground,
having introduced enough heterogeneity to invite contemplation of spe-
ciﬁc realistic reforms, but not enough to be able to deliver accurate
answers.
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Discussion Summary
Martin Feldstein noted that it was important that, after ﬁfty years, the
interest rate is only about one-tenth lower than it would otherwise be. Even
in the very long run, the simulation shows an interest rate that is 8.5 per-
cent instead of 9 percent. The general equilibrium eﬀects on wages and
real incomes are larger. However, long-run simulations of Social Security
reform that ignore general equilibrium eﬀects on interest rates are not as-
suming interest rates that are substantially diﬀerent fromw h a tg o o dg e n -
eral equilibrium analyses would imply.
Gary Burtless wasc oncerned with the implementation of the minimum
pension in the simulation. The simulation provides full minimum pensions
for everyone without examining work histories. This is not consistent with
the procedures followed by systems with minimum pensions. To be eligible
foraf ull minimum pension, most systems require that an individual earn
a minimum amount for thirty or thirty-ﬁve years. If a person only works
twenty years, then he would not be entitled to a full minimum pension.
Andrew A. Samwick indicated that simpliﬁcations in general equilibrium
Fig. 8C.4 Percentage reduction in beneﬁts from increasing the computation period
by 3 years
368 Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ,K ent Smetters, and Jan Wallisermodels might lead to poor calibrations of the remaining parameters. For
example, if the model is not designed to have precautionary saving, then
the simulated consumers derived from the model’s calibration will be more
patient than the real consumers used to calibrate the model. Consequently,
the evolution of the capital stock may be incorrect.
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